BA Philosophy Undergraduate Final Year
Module title: Free Will and Responsibility
\’Assess the Consequence argument. Does Lewis have a good response to it?\’
Essential Readings You MUST reference:
– Robert Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, (New York, Oxford University Press: 2005) Chapter 3 – Incompatibilism
– The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Edited by Robert Kane,(New York, Oxford University Press: 2002) Chapter 6 – (Thomas Kapitan, \’A Master Argument for Incompatibilism\’
Other readings to consider:
Kadri Vihvelin, Arguments for Incompatibilism, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy,
Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will
John Martin Fischer, Van Inwagen on Free Will Philosophical Quarterly (1986)
David Lewis, Are We Free to Break the Laws?, in Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will (second edition)
Tomis Kapitan, A Master Argument for Incompatibilism?, in Robert Kane (ed.), Handbook
Michael Huemer, Van Inwagen\’s Consequence Argument, Philosophical Review (2000)
Helen Beebee, Reply to Huemer on the Consequence Argument, Philosophical Review (2002)
LW. Ekstrom Free Will Ch 2
I will attach some of my other work to give you an idea of how I reference, quite simple just footnotes and a bibliography but must not be done in any other style!
Essay writing tips from my Professor:
What must be done
Do you ensure that your essay is primarily evaluative but also gives sufficient attention to both (i) finding what you can argue is the best version of the Consequence argument; (ii) Lewis response?
Do you show awareness that the Consequence argument is really a family of arguments? (e.g. van Inwagen describes what he offers as equally 3 arguments and 3 versions of one argument; p. 56)
Do you ensure that, while concentrating on the Lewis response, you show knowledge of other possible responsese.g. the Compatibilist may well think that they can appeal to the conditional analysis of ability; have you shown precisely how they might do that? And whether it is a stronger or weaker response than that of Lewis?
For extra points, have you considered?
The possibility that another version of the Consequence argument might be immune to Lewis response?
The Consequence arguments appeal to the general principle (P*): if S can render r false, and if q entails r, then S can render q false is not an appeal to a trivial truth as van Inwagen thinks it is?
The implications of the Lewis responsee.g. that the Incompatibilist who can block this response may nevertheless have to (i) distinguish between a notion of freedom based on could do otherwise and on up-to-usness and (ii) prefer one to the other?