In Law’s Empire, Dworkin argues that legal theory must be “interpretive” because useful theories of law must try to understand the “argumentative character” of legal practice—that is the fact that people debate about what their law means. Taking up this perspective means that the interpretation of law must try to see the law as if it expressed a unifying vision or ideal. What could Dworkin say to a legal realist, such as J. Frank, or other skeptic who challenges the assumption that such a perspective is the best one from which to understand what law is?

In Law’s Empire, Dworkin argues that legal theory must be “interpretive” because useful theories of law must try to understand the “argumentative character” of legal practice—that is the fact that people debate about what their law means. Taking up this perspective means that the interpretation of law must try to see the law as if it expressed a unifying vision or ideal. What could Dworkin say to a legal realist, such as J. Frank, or other skeptic who challenges the assumption that such a perspective is the best one from which to understand what law is?